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The Puzzle of Virtual Theft 
N. Wildman & N. McDonnell 
[This is the final draft of a forthcoming article; please quote/cite the published version] 
 
How can you steal something that doesn’t exist? This question confronts those of us who (i) take an irrealist 
view of virtual objects, and who (ii) agree with the Supreme Court of the Netherlands that robbery took 
place when two boys used non-virtual violence to coerce a third boy into relinquishing his virtual amulet 
and mask. Here, we outline this Puzzle of Virtual Theft, along with the closely related Puzzle of Virtual Value. 
After demonstrating how these puzzles are deeply problematic for the irrealist, we go on to sketch a 
solution that not only circumscribes the puzzles but also offers a framework by which legal scholars can 
make sense within existing legal codes of the new phenomenon of virtual theft. 
 
The details of Supreme Court of the Netherlands case 10/00101 J are (sadly) all too mundane: in 
September 2007, two older boys assaulted and physically threated a third, younger boy, in an 
attempt to intimidate the latter into giving them his property. What makes the case interesting is 
the peculiar nature of this property: a magic amulet and an enchanted mask within the massive 
multiplayer online role-playing game RuneScape.1 Specifically, under duress, the victim was 
forced to log into the game and “drop” the items, whereupon one of the perpetrators logged in 
and picked them up, thereby transferring exclusive control of the amulet and mask to his 
account. In this way, what occurred was a mixed-reality shake-down: the threat of real-world 
violence was used to extract virtual property from the victim. 
 The prosecution sought charges of theft accompanied by violence (i.e., robbery). Both 
assailants were initially convicted in lower court rulings. Appeals were then mounted. Much of 
the argument centred on the ontological status of the virtual items in question. The key issue was 
that if the amulet and mask were not ‘real’, then they could not be goods, and if they were not 
goods, then, per Article 310 of the Dutch Criminal Code, they could not be the objects of theft. 
So, prosecutors and defenders debated whether the objects in question were mere ‘bits and 
bytes’ (Runescape Judgment §3.4, our translation), ‘tangible’ (Runescape Judgement §2.3; our 
translation), or were ‘purely imaginary’ (Wolswijk 2012: 461).  
In the end, the court determined that the virtual objects under consideration had 
demonstrable value to the parties in the case, and therefore had value simpliciter. Consequently, 
in 2012, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands upheld the conviction and dismissed the appeals, 
declaring that ‘virtual items can be regarded as goods and can therefore be the subjects of such 
property offences’ (Wolswijk 2012: 460). 
As well as being exciting for legal theorists and philosophers of law, this case is directly 
relevant to on-going debates in metaphysics and aesthetics concerning the ontology of virtual 
reality.2 In particular, virtual realists claim that virtual objects are ‘real’ – i.e., they genuinely exist – 
and virtual events genuinely occur.3 Meanwhile, virtual irrealists hold that virtual objects are not 
‘real’ (i.e., they don’t exist), and events that take place in virtual reality do not genuinely occur.4 
                                                 
1 In RuneScape, players control avatars in a virtual world, and use virtual spells and weapons to fight and quest their 
way to game success. This success takes the form of achieving experience points, skill levels, and items. Possessing 
certain items in the game can help players achieve in-game success, attract kudos from fellow-gamers, or be traded 
(including beyond the game, for hard currency). 
2 The case concerns a more traditional video game, which might suggest that it falls outwith the scope of some more 
restrictive realist positions. For the present dialectic, this is irrelevant. We are here concerned with a prima facie 
problem for irrealism, which we characterise as committed to the non-existence of virtual objects, no matter the 
medium. What exactly different flavours of realism say about the case is not our concern, beyond the fact that some 
realist option appears to have a better prima facie position than anti-realism. And, for what it is worth, we think that 
it is just a matter of time before an equivalent case arises in relation to a pure VR setting. 
3 This is a simplification of realism. For example, Chalmers (2017) defends a version of realism that associates each 
virtual object with a digital object – the bits and bytes physically encoded in a silicon chip of a computer. Roughly, 
his position is that these digital objects are uncontroversially real, and virtual objects are either identical to them, or 
stand in some weaker, ‘more subtle’ dependence relation (2017: 317), ensuring that they are also real. Thus Chalmers 
is a realist about both digital and virtual objects. In contrast, the anti-realist position we sketch is realist about digital 
The court’s ruling generates a puzzle for irrealists. Put bluntly, how can you steal 
something that does not exist? Sharpening this into an objection, we can say that: 
 
(1) Only existent things can be stolen. 
(2) Virtual objects can be stolen. 
(3) Therefore, virtual objects exist. 
 
The argument is clearly valid, and the conclusion is (obviously) incompatible with irrealism. 
Further, (1) is prima facie true: plausibly, steals is a non-intentional relation, and existing is a 
necessary condition for standing in a non-intentional relation. Finally, (2) comports with the 
findings of the court, and hence is supported by legal practice. Thus, the puzzle of virtual theft 
confronts the irrealist. 
 The court’s line of reasoning also raises a second, related puzzle concerning how a virtual 
thing can be valuable:  
  
(4) Only existent things can be valuable. 
(5) Virtual objects can be valuable. 
(6) Therefore, virtual objects exist. 
  
As before, this argument is valid and the conclusion incompatible with irrealism. Similarly, (4) is 
prima facie plausible, while (5) is a direct consequence of the court’s ruling. Thus the puzzle of 
virtual value also confronts the irrealist. 
 Would-be irrealists must find solutions to these puzzles. One option is to deny that the 
relevant relations are existence entailing; e.g., citing the intentional status of property relations, 
one could argue that stealing is not a non-intentional relation, while an appeal to the apparent 
value of imaginary friends would seem to motivate the thought that valuing (in the relevant 
sense) isn’t existence entailing either. This would allow the irrealist to reject (1) and (4).  For our 
part, we suspect that these premises are likely true. Moreover, we think there is a solution to the 
puzzles that does not require rejecting these premises.  So, we will grant (1) and (4) for the sake 
of argument.  
We are led, then, to reject (2) and (5). There are (roughly) two ways that irrealists might 
go about undercutting these premises. The flatfooted strategy argues that the court’s ruling is 
simply wrong; as the relevant virtual objects do not exist, they are neither potentially valuable nor 
were they in fact stolen.5 Alternatively, the conciliatory strategy accepts the ruling, but contends 
that it does not provide support for (2)/(5).  
 Here, we offer a version of the conciliatory strategy. Specifically, we contend that, though 
there was indeed an instance of robbery, the goods that were stolen were not the virtual objects. 
In this way, the court reached the right conclusion, but about the wrong objects. 
 
1. The Parable of the Pawn 
Before turning to our solution, it is worth briefly discussing an analogy from the analogue 
gaming world of chess:: are pawns real? Sharpening the question, consider the pawn figurine, and 
the in-game pawn. The former is made of wood, has a certain weight, has a spatio-temporal 
location, etc. The latter, meanwhile, has highly restricted movement abilities, can metamorphose 
into a queen when it reaches the other end of the board, and can only vanquish its opponents by 
moving diagonally. None of these features are obvious properties of the figurine. To interrogate 
                                                                                                                                                        
objects, but denies the existence of virtual objects. For critical discussion of Chalmers’ position, see e.g. Beisbart 
2019 and McDonnell & Wildman 2019. 
4 Again, this is a simplification of irrealism. See e.g. McDonnell & Wildman 2019 for further discussion. 
5 Of course, no one will deny the reality of the (threats of) violence committed by the perpetrators. 
the relationship between the figurine and the game-object, consider three distinct modes of chess 
playing: 
 
Standard Chess Correspondence Chess Blindfold Chess 
There is one chessboard, with 
thirty-two figurines. Each 
game-object is represented by 
one figurine. 
There are two distinct 
chessboards, each with its own 
set of thirty-two figurines (so, 
sixty-four in total). Each 
game-object is represented by 
two distinct figurines, one on 
each board. 
There is no chessboard, and 
there are no figurines. The 
game is played by 
communicating moves via 
algebraic notation. Each 
game-object is represented by 
zero figurines. 
 
Standard chess makes it tempting to identify the game-object with the physical figurine, since 
there is a one-to-one relationship between them. Correspondence chess shows that this 
identification is a mistake: the same game-object is associated with two distinct physical figurines, 
so the former cannot be identical to the figurines.6 A relation weaker than identity is required. 
Suppose it is some form of dependence relation, where the game-object depends on the physical 
figurine(s). Blindfold chess, where a single game-object corresponds to no physical figurines, 
shows that this is also mistaken. And the details here don’t matter: replace dependence with 
constitution, grounding, etc. – the result is the same. 
 What then should we say about how the figurine and the game object relate? Here’s a 
plausible answer: strictly speaking, there is no relationship. This is because, strictly speaking, 
while the figurine clearly exists – after all, it is made of wood, has a certain weight, has a spatio-
temporal location, etc. – the game-object does not. Instead, it is merely an object of our 
imagination. This neatly explains the above difficulties: the game-object does not exist, and 
hence does not (and cannot) stand in a genuine relation with the figurine.  
 The closest there is to anything like a “relation” is that the figurine is a tool that can help 
us imagine things about the game-object. For example, using the figurine, together with (say) 
other figurines and a 64-square board can greatly facilitate the relevant imaginative exercise. 
Further, absent the figurine, you may struggle to remember the (imaginary) location of the game-
object, and your performance may suffer as a result. 
Keeping this in mind, suppose you are sitting down to play chess. Just before the game 
starts, someone runs up to the table, grabs one of the pawn figurines from the board, and darts 
away. In this scenario, it is natural to say that someone ‘stole your pawn’. But is it true that they  
‘stole your pawn’? In one sense, yes: the physician figurine, which exists, has been taken. In 
another sense, no: the game-object was not and cannot be stolen, because it does not exist. 
Moreover, if we’re talking loosely, it is easy to mistakenly think that the referent of ‘pawn’ used 
in describing the scenario denotes the game-object. But that is a mistake, because there simply is 
no such thing in reality. 
 
2. Solving the Puzzles 
The view sketched in the previous section is an irrealist treatment that takes the game-object to 
be a fictional object, which is, at least sometimes, associated with a physical representation – i.e., 
the figurine. More specifically, it is a version of Waltonian Fictionalism. The foundation of 
Walton’s account is a general view about representational artwork. According to Walton, our 
engagement with representational artworks involves playing games of make-believe. These games 
are guided and (partially) determined by two related elements: props, items whose existence and 
features are used to guide and determine the contents of these games, and principles of generation, 
                                                 
6 Objection: why not say there are two game-objects, each identical to their respective figurine? Reply: Suppose Ben 
and Jason are playing a game of correspondence chess with each other. If we follow the line in this objection, it is 
hard to see how this could be possible – at best, they are playing distinct, albeit similar, games. 
which prescribe what it is we are to make-believe (often by reference to relevant features of the 
props, though they need not do so). For example, we might go into the forest and play a game of 
make-believe whereby tree stumps are taken to be bears. Here, the props are ourselves and the 
various tree stumps we come across, with features like the stump’s real size and physical location 
determining things that we are prescribed to imagine (e.g., the size/location of specific bears). 
And this game will be regulated by principles of generation like, ‘if you see a tree stump, then 
you are prescribed to imagine that there is a bear where the stump is’.7 
 In the pawn case, the rules of chess serve as principles of generation, while the various 
figurines (and the board) serve as props. Further, as the possibility of blindfold chess indicates, 
these props are merely helpful in playing the game, rather than strictly necessary. 
 The Waltonian approach also readily applies in the case of virtual reality. The relevant 
props are digital objects – bits and bytes physically encoded in a silicon chip of a computer – as 
well as screen images, sounds, haptic feedback, etc. These, together with relevant principles of 
generation, help us play games of make-believe where we move through virtual worlds. 
Armed with the Waltonian apparatus, we can explain both the Court’s conclusion, and 
provide explanation and justification for their reasoning. 
 First, the objects that were stolen are certainly digital objects (the ‘bits and bytes’ 
encoded on the silicone chip). These were broadly physical objects, and so there is no puzzle as 
to their existence. Utilising the mechanics of the programme RuneScape, the thieves gained and 
established exclusive access to these digital objects. In this way, domain and control over this 
digital object was removed from the victim unlawfully (which is theft), and this process was 
aided by the use of violent coercion, (which makes it robbery).8 
 The court did not assert that a digital object was stolen, however, but rather referred to 
the game objects – the mask and the amulet – directly. Of course, as with “pawn” there is likely 
some ambiguity of reference between two objects under consideration: the digital object and the 
virtual object. We do not think this explains the court’s determination, however. We think that 
they were simply mistaken about the ontological status of the objects in question, as much of 
their explicit reasoning demonstrates. With fictionalist resources we can see the underlying 
confusion in these questions: the prop is mere bits and bytes, is tangible, and is not imaginary; 
the game-object is not mere bits and bytes, is not tangible, and is imaginary. 
 Recall also that the court did not reach a direct determination on the reality of the objects 
in question – we can surmise that they were indeed puzzled by the ontological issue – but rather 
reasoned indirectly via the issue of value. Since the objects were demonstrably of value to the 
assailants and the victim, then they were goods.  
Again, the Waltonian apparatus can help us understand this reasoning. What was of value 
was the game experience, just like playing a game of chess, or reading a book can be a valuable 
experience. The value of the experience does not entail the independent value of the fictional 
characters in the story, or the fictional game pawn, and nor does it entail the value of virtual 
masks or amulets. The value of the experience may causally hinge on the prop for those fictional 
objects, however, if they are essential to the game of make believe – just like the loss of the 
figurine could be essential to your ability to play chess, if blindfold chess is beyond you. As such, 
the valuable experience of enjoying the story, of playing chess, or advancing in RuneScape may be 
mediated by access to the physical prop that supports the imaginative enterprise. Depriving 
                                                 
7 For further discussion of the general Waltonian approach, see e.g. Walton (1990) and Woodward (2014); for more 
on video games/VR as Waltonian games of make-believe, see e.g. Tavinor (2009), Wildman & Woodward (2018), 
and McDonnell & Wildman (2019). 
8 Objection: ‘bits and bytes’ can’t be stolen unless the chip they are on is also stolen. Reply: take any case where a 
hacker remotely accesses your computer, copies some of your personal files, and then wipes your hard-drive. The 
hacker has stolen your data – i.e. has unlawfully taken exclusive domain and control over your digital objects (your 
files) – but done so without stealing any of your computer’s hardware. 
someone of the prop deprives them of something of greater value than the material value of that 
object in isolation: namely, the make-believe experience that the prop is necessary for. 
So, we think that the court reasoned correctly from the evident value at stake, to the 
presence of some good. We think they made a mistake about what that good was, however. The 
good in question was the prop – an uncontroversial physical object – and not the virtual object. 
Thus, the puzzles are solved.9 
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